The plaintiffs’ argument that the Georgia Act violates the dormant or negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is without merit

The plaintiffs’ argument that the Georgia Act violates the dormant or negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is without merit In the context of a plaintiff’s challenge to the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a loan agreement, we have held that the plaintiff must allege that an arbitration between the lender and the borrower is imminent or «certainly impending However, if a state regulation only indirectly affects interstate commerce and regulates both in-state and out-of-state interests equally, courts «have examined whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.» Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579, 106 S. Ct. at 2084. Though the two tiers of analysis are not clearly distinguishable, » [i]n either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.» Id. It is undisputed that the Act makes no attempt to regulate the interest rate out-of-state banks can charge borrowers in Georgia. In-state banks, however, are limited to Georgia’s 16% cap. In-state banks may not use payday stores to charge more than Georgia’s 16% cap no matter what the in-state banks pay the payday stores. Therefore, the Act actually places fewer restrictions on out-of-state banks than it does on Georgia-based banks. Consequently, there is no violation of the dormant or negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. […]